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Rebuilding
a
Broken
Regime:
Restructuring the Export Administration
Act
ABSTRACT

The Export Administration Act (EAA) authorizes the
President to control the export of "dual-use" goods and
technology for national security and foreign policy purposes.
'Dual-use" items are goods or technology that are commercial or
civil in nature and can be used to produce sophisticated,
dangerous weaponry. The EAA expired ten years ago, and
although it has been continued by various Executive Orders
since, Congress has failed to renew the legislation.As part of the
larger export control regime in the United States, the EAA has
been an utter failure. Dual-use goods have made their way into
the hands of a number of dangerous nations, and the EAA has
done little to prevent the illegal or undesirable transfers.
There are many flaws in the present export control regime.
A multitude of statutes and regulations govern dual-use
technology transfers, forming a bureaucracy that is impossible
to adhere to for the private sector and impossible to manage for
the government. An international regime, the Wassenaar
Arrangement offers a glimmer of hope for global cooperation in
dual-use transfers, though it also has shortcomings. U.S.
companies waste time seeking to comply with the EAA and the
regime is also unable effectively to follow up on the end-use and
end-user of dual-use technology
This Note argues that a four-pronged approachis necessary
to improve export controls on dual-use items. It calls for
strengthening end-use and end-user verification, increasing
transparency in dual-use transfers, and bolstering the
Wassenaar Arrangement. In addition, this Note proposes that
the newly created Homeland Security Department should be
given oversight of dual-use technology transfers in the new
Export Administration Act. By developing an EAA reflective of
the need for improved security and increased flexibility, the twin
goals of the U.S. export control regime can be realized: the
protection of national security and promotion of U.S. industry
in the internationalmarketplace.
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I. INTRODUCTION

On September 6, 2001, the U.S. Senate passed Senate Bill 149,
legislation designed to overhaul the "Export Administration Act"
(EAA). The EAA was designed to establish "an effective, modern
framework for export controls by reforming and replacing the Export
Administration Act of 1979, a statute that authorizes the President to
control the export of dual-use items for national security, foreign
policy, and short supply purposes."' One analysis of the bill concluded
"this under-the-radar legislation would allow U.S. companies to
export products that could make it far easier for ... sinister leaders
to build up their war-making capabilities. In essence we would be
helping the very people we may well find ourselves fighting. '2 The
legislation is now considered dead and the bill will have to be
redrafted, but the world is a vastly different place than it was when
the Senate passed this bill. The issue has received scant attention

1.
S. 149, 107th Cong. (2001); see also S. REP. No. 107-010 (2001).
2.
Larry M. Wortzel, Marketplace for Terror Trinkets?, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 17,
2002, available at http://www.washtimes.com/commentary/20021017-57404.htm (last
visited Nov. 21, 2003).
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from a press and public focused on high-profile conflicts in Iraq and
North Korea. 3 In light of the large number of terrorist attacks
occurring in recent years, the recent war against Iraq, and
threatening behavior by unfriendly nations, perhaps it is time to pay
more attention to legislation that could come back to haunt the
United States in a very deadly sense.
Section II of this Note describes the current U.S. export control
regimes. Part A describes the two main statutes governing dual-use
goods and technologies. Part B details some of the fissures in the
regimes and noted failures over the past decade. Part C discusses the
EAA legislation currently before Congress. Section III explores the
many problems associated with the current export control regimes.
Part A of Section III discusses the bewilderment businesses often
experience when trying to comply with export controls, and Part B
details the bureaucratic obstacles faced by U.S. companies. Part C
describes the lack of end-use and end-user verification inherent in the
current regime. Part D explores how Wassenaar Arrangement, an
international attempt to control dual-use exports, has failed to
achieve its goals. Section IV introduces a proposal for fixing the
current export control regime. It is a four-pronged approach that calls
for strengthening end-user verification, increasing transparency, and
strengthening the Wassenaar Arrangement. In addition, this Note
will also propose that the newly created Homeland Security
Department should be given oversight of dual-use technology
transfers in the new Export Administration Act.

II.

BACKGROUND ON THE UNITED STATES EXPORT CONTROL REGIME

A. The Current State of Affairs
Two major statutes govern the export of "dual-use" goods and
technology, the Export Administration Act (EAA)4 and the Arms
Export Control Act (ACEA)5 . "Dual-use" goods are goods or
technology that are commercial in nature that can be used either
directly or indirectly to produce sophisticated weaponry.6 The ACEA
declares that
[A]n ultimate goal of the United States continues to be a world which is
free from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of
armaments; in which the use of force has been subordinated to the rule

3.
Id.
4.
50 U.S.C. § 2401 (1994).
5.
22 U.S.C. § 2751 (2002).
6.
R. Aylan Broadbent, U.S. Export Controls on Dual-Use Goods and
Technologies: Is the High Tech Industry Suffering, 8 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 49, 49
(1999).
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of law; and in which international adjustments to a changing world are
achieved peacefully. 7

To that end, under the ACEA, the Department of State promulgated
the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) in order to
monitor and control the shipment of military and "dual-use"
technologies or goods.8 The EAA, continued by presidential order
under the fEEPA9 , purports to monitor the shipment of dual-use
technology and goods. 10 The Export Administration Regulations
(EAR),' 1 (promulgated under the EAA) and continued by Presidential
order under IEEPA, 12 are used by the Department of Commerce
(through the Bureau of Industry and Security-the BIS) to control
the export of non-military technology and goods, which also include
dual-use technologies and goods. Thus, problematic dual-use
technologies and goods can be covered by the ACEA or the EAA under
13
ITAR, EAR, neither, or both.
Although the Senate approved legislation, designed to renew the
EAA in September 2001, the House never passed its version of the
legislation even though the House International Relations Committee
(HIRC) and the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) separately
approved different versions of the bill. 14 The Bush White House and
key House Republicans set March 1, 2003 as the target date for
House passage of new EAA legislation,' 5 but that deadline passed
16
without any effort by Congress to renew the EAA.
In addition to the above-mentioned statutes and regulations,
various other export statutes and regulations are designed to further
the U.S. security interests. 17 This includes a virtual alphabet soup of
names such as the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA)' 8 ,

7.
22 U.S.C. § 2751 (2002).
8.
See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
9.
Exec. Order No. 12924, 59 Fed. Reg. 43,437 (Aug. 19, 1994). When the EAA
expired in 1994, President Clinton continued the export authority by executive order.
10.
See id.
11.
15 C.F.R. §§ 730-74 (2002).
12.
Exec. Order No. 12924, supra, note 9.
13.
Ronald J. Sievert, Urgent Message to Congress-Nuclear Triggers to Libya,
Missile Guidance to China, Air Defense to Iraq, Arms Suppliers to the World: Has the
Time Finally Arrived to Overhaul the U.S. Export Control Regime?-The Case for
Immediate Reform of Our Outdated, Ineffective, and Self-Defeating Export Control
Regime, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 89, 93 (2002).
14.
Gary G. Yerkey, Once More into the Breach for EAA Legislation, 20 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 3, Jan. 16, 2003, at 145.
15.
Gary G. Yerkey, White House, GOP Leaders Set March 1 as New Target for
House Approval of EAA Bill, 19 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 49, Dec. 12, 2002 at 2116.
16.
Gary G. Yerkey, Rep. Dreier Says Prospects for Passage of Export Control
Legislation Not Good, 20 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 16, at 664 (Apr. 17, 2003).
17.
Id. at 90.
18.
Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1-44 (2002).
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International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)19, AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) 20 , Nuclear NonProliferation Act (OFAC) 2 1, and various U.S. Treasury directives.
The United States is also party to a number of international
agreements regarding dual-use technologies and goods. During the
Cold War, the main international control regime was the
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral
Export Controls
(COCOM).2 2 It was disbanded in 1994, and two years later the

Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms
and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (Wassenaar) was
established.2 3 Wassenaar's primary objectives are "to promote
transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional
arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing
destabilizing accumulations and to enhance cooperation to prevent
the acquisition of armaments and sensitive dual-use items for
military end-users. '24 To this end, Wassenaar is designed to promote
transparency and greater responsibility in transfers by providing a
forum for countries to exchange information so that they can have a
better understanding of the risks of various transfers. 25 However,
Wassenaar is not a legally binding treaty and has no enforcement or
monitoring regimes.2 6 Its force is derived mainly from the voluntary
political commitments of its members. 27 This is a major roadblock in
achieving Wassenaar's goals.
'28
Wassenaar establishes export controls based on two "pillars.
The dual-use pillar divides goods into two different tiers, depending
upon their sensitivity. 29 When a member state denies an export

license to a non-member state, they agree to notify the
members. 30 For more sensitive items, members notify the
members twice a year of any transfers made to non-members
aggregate basis. 31 There is no obligation to consult with

other
other
on an
other

19.
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06
(2002).
20.
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332(d),
2339(B) (2002).
21.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, 22 U.S.C. § 3201 (2002).

22.

Kenneth A. Dursht, From Containment to Cooperation: Collective Action

and the WassenaarArrangement, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1079, 1080 (1997).
23.
Id.
24.
Id. at 1081.
25.
Id. at 1108.

26.

Wade Boese, GAO Says Multilateral Export Control Regimes Too Weak,

ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Nov. 2002, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/
2002_11/gaonovO2.asp (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
27.
Dursht, supra note 22, at 1109.
28.
Id. at 1110.
29.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.
Id.
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member states prior to granting a license, even if they have
previously denied the transfer of the exact same item.3 2 There is a
weak "no-undercut" provision, whereby states are required to notify
all other member states within 30 to 60 days of an approval of a
transfer that another state has denied in the last three years.3 3 This
34
attempt at transparency, while a good start, does not go far enough.
B. Breakdowns in Export Controls
The policy interests of the EAA, ACEA, Wassenaar, and others
are rarely achieved under the current export control regime. Iraq
provides one example of the shortcomings of the export control
statutes and regulations. Many of the products Saddam Hussein
attempted to acquire-aluminum tubes, triggers, carbon fibers and
other products useful for constructing nuclear weapons-would be
considered "mass market items" under the bill approved by the
Senate to renew the EAA. Thus, they would be fit for export without
restriction.3 5 Many of the biological samples Saddam used in his
bioweapons program were sent directly from the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention in the 1980s. 36 They were legal transfers at
the time. 37 According to recently released materials, the United
States has allowed the export of a wide variety of dual-use equipment
and supplies to Iraq, including computerized databases (presumably
to help track political opponents), helicopters to transfer Iraqi
officials (though it is believed they were later used to spray poison gas
on the Kurds), surveillance equipment, and chemical analysis
equipment for the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.38 A cache of
missiles, manufactured in the United States, was also found after the
war. 39 They were sent legally to Iraq in the years before the first gulf
war.

40

32.
Id.
33.
Dursht, supra note 22, at 1111.
34.
For example, an October 2002 Government Accounting Office (GAO) Report
evaluated numerous multilateral export control regimes the United States was a
member of, and found with the Wassenaar Arrangement that members submitted
these aggregate reports on schedule only about 36 percent of the time. See GAO Report,
Nonproliferation: Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export Control Regimes
(Oct. 25, 2002) [hereinafter October 2002 GAO Report].
35.
Wortzel, supra note 2.
36.
Matt Kelley, US. Supplied Germs to Iraq in '80s (Sep. 30, 2002), available at
www.story.news.yahoo.comnews?tmpl=story&u=/ap2002O930/ap-n-go-ca-st-pe/us-iraq-b
ioweapons_2 (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
37.
Christopher Dickey & Evan Thomas, How Saddam Happened, NEWSWEEK,
Sep. 23, 2002, at 35, 35.
38.

Id.; see also 148 CONG. REC. S8,987 (2002).

39.
40.

Mark Hosenball, Return to Sender, NEWSWEEK, June 9, 2003, at 12.
Id.
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U.S. intelligence officials expected to find many types of dual-use
items made by Western companies as they sifted through the
wreckage after the war in Iraq ended. 41 However, it appears they
underestimated the extent of what U.S. troops would find.
Assortments of French military equipment and German-made
chemical weapon protective gear have been .found in Iraq. 42, Fifty-one
Roland-2 missiles, made by a French-German partnership of arms
manufacturers, were found in two military compounds at Baghdad
International Airport. 43 Iraqi military trucks were found with radios
baring the label "Made in France."'44 RPG night sights and Nissan
pick-up trucks were also found with the French display. 45 All of the
above can be classified as dual-use equipment or were made with
parts that are dual-use.
Potentially deadly weapons transactions extend beyond Iraq.
Between 1989 and 1990, a Texas company sent to Libya pulse
neutron generators that could be used as nuclear trigger
mechanisms. 46 In the trial of al-Queda operatives convicted of
bombing U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, it was discovered
47
that al-Queda had been shopping for uranium in South Africa.
China illegally received information and technology in 1996 from
Loral Space & Communications Ltd. and Hughes Electronics
Corporation that could be used to increase the accuracy of Chinese
intercontinental ballistic missiles. 48 In fact, according to the
Commerce Department, China is the most frequently listed
destination on export license applications, accounting for ten percent
of all applications filed in 2002.4 9 In a related incident, the State
Department charged Boeing Satellite Systems and Hughes
Electronics Corporation of illegally giving technical data to China
following failed Chinese launches of rockets carrying American
satellites in 1995 and 1996.50 A Justice Department investigation of
Loral, Boeing, and Hughes did not result in any criminal charges. 51
Loral reached a civil settlement with the State Department, while

41.

Id.

42.
Id.
43.
Arian Campo-Flores et al., I'm Shocked, Shocked!, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 21,
2003, at 8.
44.

Id.

45.
46.
47.

Id.
Sievert, supra note 13, at 90 n.14.
Know Thine Enemy-Weapons Proliferation, ECONOMIST, Feb. 2, 2002, at

24.
48.
Broadbent, supra note 6, at 54.
49.
William New, Exports, Meet National Security, 34 NAT. J. No. 44, Nov. 2,
2002, at 3216.
50.
Boeing, Hughes Accused of Giving Rocket Data to Chinese Illegally, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 2, 2003, at A6.
51.
Id.
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Hughes and Boeing still face restrictions of sales overseas and heavy
52
fines.
Syria, which has been accused of supporting terrorism through
the Iranian-backed Lebanese group Hezbollah, has fewer U.S.
sanctions than any other country on the State Department's list of
nations that - support terrorism. 53 Congress recently passed the
"Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of
2003" which bans the export of dual-use items until Syria meets
several conditions. 54 Even then, Syria may continue to receive
shipments of dual-use items from the United States, mostly because
the administration frequently turns a blind eye as a way of thanking
55
Syria for its help on other fronts of the war on terror.
There are other concerns beyond the direct transfer of illicit
technology between U.S. companies and foreign countries. Due to an
ability to follow-up on the end-use of many dual-use technologies, the
dilemma often arises where one buyer, who may be approved for
exporting certain technology, transfers that same technology to an
unapproved buyer. For example, the air defense system used by the
former Iraqi government was upgraded with fiber optic technology
sold to China by the United States and then installed in Iraq by
Chinese engineers. 56 Similar situations arise when a business
partner in an international joint venture transfers shared U.S.
technology to a buyer not approved under any U.S. regulatory export
scheme, such as North Korea, or when a U.S. company receives
technology from one country (for example, Russia), and then transfers
that information to another country (like France). Once in U.S.
hands, the government considers it U.S. technology and the
subsequent transfer may violate export restrictions. 57 Siemens, a
German company, legally sold krypton electronic switches to Iraq,
supposedly for use by doctors to break up kidney stones. 58 When
Saddam asked for another 120 parts, the company became suspicious,
and then realized that the switches could also be used to trigger
59
nuclear devices.

52.
53.

Id.
Susan Taylor

Martin, Experts Disagree on Dangers of Syria, ST.

PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 3, 2002, available at http://www.sptimes.com/2002/11/03/

WorldandnationExperts-disagree on d.shtml (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
54.
Id; see also S. 982, 108th Cong. (2003).
55.
Id.
56.
Sievert, supra note 13, at 91 n.19.
57.
This is true even if Russia and France directly share technology.
58.
See Wortzel, supra note 2.
59.
Id.
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C. The EAA Legislation
Senate Bill 149 (S.149), intended to revamp the EAA, passed the
Senate in September 2001. Since that time, the world has changed.
Yet Congress has made no effort to reintroduce,EAA legislation. More
than ever, the United States needs an export control regime that
advances the twin goals of protecting national security and promoting
60
the international competitiveness of U.S. industries.
The bill approved by the Senate ,to renew the EAA "recognizes
and seeks to balance three important U.S. policy interests. '61 First,
there is the U.S. national security interest in controlling the export of
dual-use goods, services, and technologies to (a) limit the military
potential of countries that threaten the United States or its allies; (b)
impede the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the
62
means to deliver them; and (c) deter international terrorism.
Second, there are the U.S. interest in promoting U.S. exports and
maintaining U.S. leadership in the global economy. 63 Third, the
United States has strong foreign policy interests in promoting
international peace, stability, and respect for fundamental human
rights, and this legislation establishes the principles for effective use
of economic sanctions, including foreign policy export controls, to
64
promote such interests.
Senator Michael Enzi (R-Wyo.), the principal author of S.149,
plans to reintroduce the bill in the near future with changes designed
to attract House support. 65 He still believes the bill is a "good piece of
legislation" but considers the bill dead in terms of congressional
approval. 66 In an odd twist of fate for Republicans, Senator Richard
Shelby (R-Ala.) took over as chairman of the Senate Banking
Committee when the Republicans recaptured control of the Senate in
November 2002.67 Shelby is a longtime opponent of easing controls
over exports and was the only member of the committee to vote
against S.149.68 Some predict Shelby may try to rewrite the

60.
Chart summarizing status of key legislation, 19 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
No. 34, Aug. 22, 2002, at 1473 (quoting Undersecretary of Commerce for Industry and
Security Kenneth Juster).
61.
S. REP. No. 107-010 (2001).
62.
Id.
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
Sen. Enzi Plans to Reintroduce EAA Bill with Changes to Attract House
Support, 19 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 48, Dec. 5, 2002, at 2077.

66.
67.
68.

See Yerkey, supra note 15; see also Yerkey, supra note 15.
See discussion supra note 60.
Id.
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legislation to bring it in line with the legislation approved by two
69
committees in the House (the HIRC and HASC).
Supporters of the HIRC and HASC versions of the bill argue that
S.149 would threaten national security by loosening U.S. export
controls. 70 Supporters of S.149 (including the Bush White House and
U.S. industry) argue that the House versions effectively tighten
restrictions on high-tech exports to the detriment of U.S.
competitiveness abroad without enhancing U.S. national security in a
significant way. 71 Enzi believes the rewritten bill will address many
of the concerns raised by Shelby and supporters of the House
versions. 72 In a letter to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice
in early 2003, Shelby and other senators said they wish to work with
the administration to craft a new EAA that will improve the ability of
the government to prevent dual-use technologies from aiding
potential enemies. 73 Specifically, Shelby has proposed providing the
State, Defense, and Homeland Security departments with the lead
decisionmaking roles in the export licensing process. 74 He wants to
provide a predictable and durable regulatory environment for U.S.
companies, allowing them to be competitive in the global market. At
the same time, he wants to ensure that the Defense Department can
add or remove items from the list of controlled items. 76 Shelby would
also require the concurrence of all the national security agencies for
the approval of licenses and would eliminate the ability to decontrol
critical products through foreign availability or mass-market
determinations. 76 These are effective and fair proposals that are a
step in the right direction toward repairing the EAA.
U.S. companies support S.149 as passed by the Senate two years
ago and have called on Shelby to rethink his long-standing opposition
77
to relaxing restrictions on dual-use and high technology exports.
The President of the National Foreign Trade Council has called the
bill S.149 a "solid compromise" and said it would be "very hard to
imagine that this administration would support it if it in any way

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
See generally Yerkey, supranote 14.
See generally Yerkey, supranote 15.
Id.
See Yerkey, supra note 16, at 664-65.
Gary G. Yerkey, Sen. Shelby Plans New Export Control Bill with National

Security Agencies Taking Lead, 20 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), Mar. 13, 2003, at 450, 450

n.11.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Gary G. Yerkey, Companies Urge Shelby to Rethink Approach to Export

Controls as Senate Banking Chair, 19 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), Nov. 21, 2002, at 1983,

1983 n.46.
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compromised our country's security. ' 78 Industry leaders stress that
exporters of dual-use items face challenges in the competitive global
marketplace that justify relaxing certain restrictions of exports, even
in a time of increasing security concerns and growing terrorist
threats. 79 They argue that if commercial items comparable to those
made in the U.S. are available elsewhere in the, world, then tight
restrictions and long waits for licenses merely punish U.S. businesses
without preventing enemies from gaining access to the items they
seek.80 This argument fails for two reasons. First, if the items were
truly available from other countries, enemies of the United States
would not be so eager to get their hands on the U.S. technology when
it was available elsewhere. 8 ' Second, just because enemies of the U.S
can get dual-use items from other places does not mean the United
States should just hand them over. 82 There is an interesting analogy
for this argument: we do not tell the local Wal-Mart it is okay to sale
guns and weapons to felons just because they can get illegal guns and
weapons on the black market.8 3 We should follow similar principals
for dual-use items.
However the legislation turns out in the end, the Bush
administration believes any EAA bill should reflect important
principles such as the notion that dual-use export controls must
advance U.S. national security and foreign policy interests while
reducing illegal traffic in dual-use goods.8 4 This echoes the tension
that legislation in the area of export controls has always faced,
tension between companies that want to export high-tech products to
countries such as China and the U.S. government that wants to
protect national security interests. 85 In light of September 11, 2001, it
is likely that the new EAA will not ease restrictions on exports, but
instead will strengthen protections for national security.

III. TROUBLES

WITH THE SYSTEM

A. Confusion and Chaos for U.S. Business
Under the EAR, there is a highly technical 170-page manual
called the Commerce Control List (CCL).8 6 To determine if exporting

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Id.; see also Broadbent, supra note 6, at 53.
Sievert, supra note 13, at 107.
Id.
Id.
See Yerkey supranote 14, at 145.
Id.
15 C.F.R. § 774.2 (2003); see also Sievert, supra note 13, at 93.
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to a particular country is even permitted, a company must get an
Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) from the CCL that it
then applies to a country chart.8 7 In addition, other sections of the
EAR have lists of countries, institutions, and individuals that must
be denied exports.88 The regulations further advise the companies
against exporting an item if they know or have reason to know the
product will be used in chemical, biological, or nuclear activities.8 9
U.S. companies also have to ensure they do not engage in additional
export and acquisition violations. 90 Finally, there are exceptions, and
exceptions to the exceptions, for all of the above.
All of this is extremely confusing for U.S. companies attempting
to determine whether they can legally ship certain goods or transfer
certain technologies to buyers ranging from governments to
individuals. While larger companies can afford a compliance staff,
such as an "empowered official" under ITAR, to decipher the myriad
of rules and regulations, smaller firms have little or no expertise or
experience in U.S. export laws. 91 The cost to companies in the form of
lost sales, and the decrease in foreign market share attributed to the
92
perceived inability of U.S. firms to deliver the goods is significant.
In a case before the Eighth Circuit, the defendant was an expert in
the area of export control and defended himself on the grounds that
the laws were too confusing to understand.9 3 The court rejected his
argument. 94 Unconstitutional vagueness challenges to the export
licensing criminal statutes and regulations have been consistently
rejected by federal courts. 95 Thus, the judiciary offers little hope to
businesses that were confused by the regulations and inadvertently
violated them in a technology transfer.
Another complication to the U.S. export regime is how to verify
compliance with the many treaties, regulations, and rules (both U.S.
and international), while protecting confidential business information
(CBI). The threat to CBI grows out of the need to gather information
regarding the use of dual-use technology and substances widely
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88.
Id.
89.
Id.
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Critical Technologies Under the Export Administration Act of 1979 and the Proposed
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Security, 10 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 423, 446 n.157 (1985). See generally Michael
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possessed by private industry. 96 Technology and products used in
sophisticated weaponry also has important commercial applications;
thus, the industries regulated by export controls are often leadingedge industries that have invested heavily in research and
97
development.
CBI has such high value to the companies in these. industries
that its loss is a serious threat to firms, and if it. may put them out of
business, they will likely oppose more strict regulation.9 8 To protect
national security, regulation needs to be increased to ensure the
terrorists of the world do not get their hands on U.S. dual-use
technology. At the same time, companies are worried about other
countries or companies stealing their technology for commercial
advantage. International cooperation can be achieved only if private
firms have assurances that their CBI will be protected. If companies
feel secure that their technology will be protected, they are more
likely to cooperate with regulation.
B. BureaucraticIssues
The expired version of the EAA recognizes the U.S. export policy
restrictions and places a premium on exports, while continuing to
acknowledge national security concerns and emphasizing the need to
control dual-use technology transfers. 99 It attempted to simplify
licensing under the multi-tiered group of rules, regulations and
federal agencies. Unfortunately, it still failed to streamline licensing
procedures.' 0 0 Simple licensing procedures were impossible to
implement,' 01 as a company attempting to ship one product might
have to deal with six agencies-Departments of State, Commerce,
Customs, Defense, Energy, and Treasury. 0 2 In the case of dual-use
items, it is often unclear whether such technologies and goods should
10 3
be governed by the ITAR or EAR.
For example, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
(formerly the Bureau of Export Administration), 0 4 part of the
Department of Commerce, publishes the EAR, maintains the
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Commerce Control List (CCL), and is charged with enforcing the
EAR.1 0 5 However, the Office of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC), part
of the State Department, is in charge of determining which licensing
regime applies to dual-use items.1 0 6 This means that an exporter of a
dual-use item goes to ODTC to see which licensing regime applies to
the item, and if it falls under the EAR, the BIS has identified twentynine steps involved in determining whether an export is subject to the
EAR. At this point, the exporter has not even begun to determine
licensing requirements if the item is subject to the EAR. 10 7 Bear in
mind that this is an oversimplified example of what a company must
actually undergo with all its dual-use items.
Extensive bureaucracy is a critical problem, often confusing
companies more than assisting them, and hindering the ability of the
regulations to protect national security.10 8 It also adversely affects
commerce by sending buyers elsewhere to find goods.10 9 The existing
bureaucracies and administrative mechanisms make sales more
difficult for U.S. companies. In one example, a U.S. manufacturer
developed a longstanding relationship selling aircraft components to
a U.K. aircraft manufacturer. 110 In 1989, the Customs Service
prevented the export of these components because it unilaterally
determined that the parts had potential military uses.11 1 This
mistake was eventually cleared up, but had caused unnecessary
delay, costing the U.K. importer and blemishing a lucrative
1 12
relationship with the U.S. exporter.
Much of the problem stems from policy disputes among the
agencies involved in export regulation. For example, the Department
of Commerce might approve the shipment of certain technology even
after the Department of Defense objected to it." 3 It is not hard to
understand why such disagreements are so common. Each agency has
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a different mission. Commerce is supposed to advance trade, 114 while
Defense concentrates on national security and military. 115 State is
involved in promoting international relations and Customs is left
with the job of enforcement. With so many competing goals, it is no
wonder that agreement on exporting already complex dual-use
technology and products is nearly impossible.
C. End-use and End-user Issues
End-user and end-use verification are related concepts. The goal
of end-use verification is to determine what a technology or a good is
used for after it is shipped to the purchaser. 116 This is relevant for
dual-use items, which by their very nature have differing uses, and
the manner in which they are used is very important. For example,
there is a huge difference between using glass fiber technology for
sporting goods and using it to improve weapons such as guided
missile components. 117 As an example of the failure of the EAA to
effectively regulate end-use, in the 1980s the glass fiber technology
was shipped to Iraq despite the fact that the end-user was known to
be involved in developing missile technology (thus possibly having an
end-use of military nature) because the Commerce Department's BIS
did not require an export license for the sale of "civilian" glass fiber
technology. 118
On the other hand, end-user verification concerns who is actually
going to use the dual-use item." l9 For example, after the legal (and
licensed) transfer of dual-use technology from a U.S. company to a
Russian company, the Russian business then sells the technology to
China or Iran. There is no mechanism for the government to track the
item once it approves the initial sale and thus no way for the U.S. to
120
verify which country is getting which technology.
The EAR lists a number of prohibitions that are based on the
identity of the end-user or the end-use. 121 An exporter should refrain
from exporting any product without a license to any party if that
exporter knows that the product will directly or indirectly be in used
in the research of production of nuclear, chemical, or biological
weapons. 122 However, under the current approval system, once a
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dual-use technology license is given, the BIS finds it difficult to
monitor the actual uses of that item. 123 In the international arena,
among other proposals to strengthen export controls, the United
States has been pushing for closer examination of the end-use of
exported items.124 As of the December 2002 annual plenary meeting,
the proposal had not been adopted by Wassenaar. 125 A U.S. official
remarked, "We see no good reason why any country that claims to be
serious about nonproliferation and antiterrorism would oppose these
proposals to strengthen the credibility and effectiveness of the
Wassenaar Arrangement. '' 26
Although the United States has long known that China, Russia,
and North Korea provide materials that can be used for military
purposes to dubious states, U.S. allies have contributed this
danger. 127 As can be seen from the examples in Section JIB, many
U.S. and European goods end up in the wrong hands overseas. 128 This
is the problem with most export control regimes-while raising fences
on certain goods and lowering them on others, there is no effective
mechanism in place to monitor what happens to those dual-use goods
that are shipped to approved countries. While a license may be
granted allowing the sale of aluminum tubing that can be used for
bikes or nukes to France, we do not know what France may
subsequently do with the good. France could sell it to China (they
allegedly did sell certain illicit items to Iraq), and while only political
pressure from the U.S. could be used to stop the subsequent sale, the
most likely scenario is that the U.S. will not even know of the sale to
China (the U.S. certainly did not know of the sales to Iraq until after
Saddam was ousted). 129 This is because there is nothing in the EAA
or any other export control regime that has a follow-up requirement
for the U.S. company making the original sale or for an end-use
verification by the U.S. government.13 0 In Congressional hearings
after the Gulf War it was revealed that of 771 export licenses granted
for Iraq, only one was ever checked for its end-use to ensure it was
being utilized for civilian purposes.1l3 A former Chairman of the
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House Oversight Committee complained that the "Commerce
Department issues licenses for commodities not knowing if the goods
are what they purport to be; ever reach their intended destination; or
are used for the stated legitimate purpose. 1 32
Further, if an U.S. company determines in good faith it does not
need a license to ship to an overseas purchaser, the exporter never
has to ask the buyer exactly how the item will be used by that
particular buyer, 133 much less others down the line who might
acquire the item from the initial purchaser. In such general delivery
cases (where no license is required), there is absolutely no statutory
"duty to inquire" as to the end-use of an item. 13 4 At least with those
goods and technologies that require a license, there is some inquiry
that the company must do as to the end-use of a product.13 5 The lack
of a duty to inquire in general delivery cases might have its greatest
effect when a U.S. company sells items to an intermediate or affiliate
in a country where no license is required and with an export system
less restrictive than our own. For example, if an Italian company
orders a dual-use good or technology with the unstated intent of
reselling it to China, most U.S. companies will not think twice about
shipping the item.13 6 Technically speaking, they can do it guilt-free
because they have not broken the law.
The BIS does advise companies to look for "red flags" that a
product is destined for a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon
use. 137 When a license is necessary, companies might have to obtain
an "end-user certificate" from the buyer stating that the product will
neither be used for a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons
program nor be resold or transferred without approval of the U.S.
Department of State. 138 However, there is a big distinction between
requiring a company to verify end-use for fear of criminal sanctions
and to simply ask them to be on the "look out" for questionable
exports in a fiercely competitive global market. 139 Without a
comprehensive follow-up program, the government must rely on the
end-user certificates signed by foreign buyers to provide they will not
transfer the product to others. 140 The problem is that many countries
have a fundamental objection to the extraterritorial application of
U.S. export control regulations over items once they have left U.S.
borders. 14 1 It should be clear that the certificates not to re-export are
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little more than "paper salve to the conscience of the government and
U.S. corporations," and they cannot prevent the repeated transfer of
142
sensitive dual-use technology to U.S. adversaries.
D. The InternationalRegime
On October 25, 2002 the General Accounting Office (GAO)
released the results of a 13-month study of four international regimes
intended to halt weapons proliferation. 143 Among these four regimes
was the Wassenaar Arrangement. 144 While the report notes that
experts believe the four regimes included helped limit worldwide
exports of dangerous goods and technologies, the GAO also found that
measuring the success of each regime was difficult. 145 The two main
shortcomings identified in the report are: "(1) members do not share
adequate information with each other in a timely manner about their
approval and denial of exports, and (2) they fail to implement regime
decisions quickly and consistently enough so that members' export
controls are uniform."'1 46 The voluntary nature of the regimes also
encumbers them, as well as the lack of monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms. 1 47 The report cites Russia as a state pursuing policies at
odds with the regimes' purposes, offering as evidence "a January 2001
shipment of nuclear fuel to India despite the objections of 32 other
states."'148 Other obstacles to effectiveness include the resistance of
European and former communist countries to U.S. pressure to tighten
export controls, some members lack institutional capacity and
resources effectively to implement controls, and a growing inability to
149
agree upon which countries require stricter controls.
Specifically looking at Wassenaar, the report called a "notable
accomplishment" its "successful development of an agreement among
its members for guidelines on shoulder-fired missiles such as the
Stinger". 150 However, the report also quotes the former Secretariat as
saying "the achievements of the Wassenaar Arrangement are limited
and that 'there have been no spectacular results,' but that the
situation would be worse without the Arrangement."'15 1 The
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"reporting information on export denials for Wassenaar members is
generally slow," and the report also notes the lack of a "no-undercut"
policy in the Arrangement, a provision present in the other three
regimes. 152 Though Wassenaar does require members to share
information on approved licenses, it cannot be used beneficially to
identify "undercuts of license denials, items approved and
transferred, or recipients of the items."'1 53 In other words, the
information is useless by the time the United States receives it. The
GAO noted that some members take longer to adopt agreed upon
changes, and in the case of Wassenaar, the United States was
frequently the guilty party. 154 For example, "while the European
Union was able to adopt December 2000 plenary changes within 3
months, the United States did not adopt all the changes until 15
months later," in March 2002.155
The GAO found three interrelated obstacles to strengthening
multilateral export control regimes. 156 First, "efforts to strengthen
the regimes have been hampered by a requirement to reach
consensus among all members about every decision made and by the
inability to enforce compliance with commitments in arrangements
that are voluntary and non-binding."' 57 Second, the accelerating
growth of technology and the increasing trade in sensitive items
complicates efforts to bring into line export controls and keep control
lists current. 1 58 Third, "the U.S. government has no specified or
agreed-upon criteria for assessing regimes' effectiveness.' 5 9
Applying these barriers to Wassenaar, "a single member's
objection can stalemate a regime decision."' 60 At the December 2002
plenary meeting, Russia blocked two U.S. proposals that would have
improved the exchange of information among members and taken
action to strengthen controls on exports of conventional arms and
dual-use goods and technologies that could wind up in the hands of
terrorists. 161 Efforts by Wassenaar members to agree upon countries
of concern and regions of unrest have failed because of a lack of
accord. 162 As a result, each member unilaterally determines which
163
countries to target when implementing export controls.
Arrangement members have been able to agree upon Iran, Iraq,
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Libya, and North Korea as countries of serious concern. 164 Noticeably
missing are states like Syria and other middle-eastern countries that
might harbor terrorists.
The rapid pace of technological change and growing supply of
sensitive items have further complicated efforts to harmonize
Wassenaar. These quickly evolving technologies have a specific
impact on dual-use items, such as computers, semiconductor
manufacturing, and information technologies. 165 Wassenaar has
"experienced prolonged discussion and disagreements over how or
even whether to maintain such items as high-speed computers on its
control lists."1 6 The very nature of dual-use items further spurs
debate on what should be on a control list and what should be
excluded from an export control regime. 167 The trade of controlled
items among nonmember countries with weapons programs further
168
undermines efforts to control the spread of sensitive technology.
Despite the U.S. government's policy of strengthening the
effectiveness of multilateral export control regimes, neither the U.S.
government, member governments in the regimes, nor the regimes
themselves have established clear measures for evaluating the
regimes' effectiveness. 1 69 The EAA bill as passed by the Senate in
2001 would require monitoring and annual reporting on the regimes'
effectiveness, 170 though currently the U.S. export control regime
contains nothing to evaluate the efficiency of Wassenaar. 171 The GAO
further found "that several government officials and industry
representatives noted that the mission, obligations, and political
commitment of the Wassenaar Arrangement are not as clear as those
1 72
of other regimes."'
Recalling that Wassenaar succeeded COCOM, the most notable
difference from the previous regime was the lack of a veto mechanism
in Wassenaar. 173 This was a result of a lack of consensus among
nations that established the regime in 1996.174 The net result of this
situation is that members who deny exports are essentially notifying
all other regime members that there may be an export opportunity
available to them. 175 Notification to the denying country is only
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required after the granting country has actually granted the export
license. 176 Essentially, the current Wassenaar agreement offers little
chance for an export-denying country to exercise any influence over
other members prior to their transfer of dual-use items. 177 One
proposal the United States has advanced (and Russia has blocked)
recognizes that a veto mechanism is unworkable in a broad
agreement like Wassenaar, and so advocates the use of mandatory
178
denial consultations.

IV. RESOLUTIONS

There are a number of different proposals and ideas aimed at
improving the U.S. export control regime. Few commentators argue
that strengthening the multilateral export control regime would fail
to enhance the U.S. ability to track and control those who get
sensitive dual-use technology and goods. 179 As discussed earlier, the
twin objectives of the U.S. export control regime are (1) protecting
and enhancing national security and (2) promoting the international
competitiveness of U.S. industry in the global marketplace.1 80 The
delicate balance that must be struck between these two goals requires
careful thought and tough decisions. U.S. industries will continue to
push for relaxed export controls, while proponents of regulation
(particularly the Defense and Homeland Security Departments) will
continue to fight for ever higher fences and stricter licensing
requirements. As Congress takes up the issue of refining the Export
Administration Act in the near future, there are four considerations
that can help improve national security without too severely
restricting exports. They focus on improving the information
available regarding exports and their end-uses, on strengthening
Wassenaar because it offers perhaps the most promising chance for
international cooperation on the transfer of dual-use items, and
finally on eliminating some of the bureaucratic red tape that has
confused U.S. businesses over the years and cost them millions,
which can be achieved by moving oversight of dual-use exports to the
Homeland Security Department.
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A. End-use/End-user Verification
Any effective export control regime should have mechanisms in
place that can identify the end-uses and end-users of dual-use goods
and technologies. Despite the fact that there is a list in the EAR that
regulates exports based on the identity of end-users and end-uses, it
has fallen short of adequately addressing national security
concerns.18 1 Further, leaving it to the private sector to be on the
watch for "red flags" is unrealistic because it assumes that businesses
are spending time actually looking for suspicious behavior and that it
is in their best interest to do so. There must be a system established
to check the end-use of products as well as their end-user. Thus, an
extensive verification provision should be written into the new EAA
legislation. Senator Shelby has proposed that end-users that refuse to
permit post-shipment verifications to ensure dual-use products are
not being used for military purposes be barred from receiving any
82
controlled items until verifications have been allowed.'
One suggestion for such a mechanism has been to take
advantage of ever-improving computer technology to eliminate
difficulties in interpreting the regulations.' 8 3 This would reverse the
burden on companies in determining whether a license is required for
exports of dual-use goods and technologies. 18 4 In sum, the system
might work as follows. The government designates certain items that
it wants to review (probably the most sensitive dual-use goods and
technologies); the company sends a notice to the government that it
wants to export technology or goods falling under the definition; and
lastly, the government determines if a license is necessary and
decides whether to grant the license.' 8 5 This would allow the
government and the exporting company to communicate with each
other, a great benefit for both parties when faced with a hard decision
concerning the necessity of a license. The company can ensure it is
properly complying with the law, and the government will become
more aware of the technology flowing out of the country. In addition,
a database containing information on past exports could allow an

See generally Sievert, supranote 13, at 104; Yerkey, supra note 14.
181.
182.
Yerkey, supra note 14.
183.
Sievert, supra note 13, at 104.
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and technologies when considering
exporter to check for similar goods
8 6
whether a license is necessary.'
There is no reason to worry about the potential bureaucracy
necessary to handle the system. First, if UPS can track the position of a
package in transport within an hour of its last location, it is rather
difficult to believe the government could not handle a similar system
when national security is at issue. Second, the BIS already fields
questions and inquiries; it would probably be more efficient to
centralize them on a computer where the history of such requests could
be viewed by future importers. Third, once the database is established,
companies will be able to search for similar technology and rely in good
faith on past results in determining whether a license is necessary to
export certain dual-use goods and technologies. When a license is not
required, companies could be required to send a simple email notifying
the government of the purchaser and product.' 8 7 Finally, the Customs
Bureau has already begun to implement an electronic data interchange
system to collect cargo information on imports and exports.' 8 8 Linking
this system to a database of licenses would be very effective in tracking
the shipment of dual-use items.
A computer system with a database such as this will improve
end-use and end-user verification in a number of ways. First, it
removes the burden to watch for "red flags" from the companies and
puts it back were it should be, with the government. What better way
for a government to track the end-uses and end-users of certain dualuse goods than to have a database with easily accessible information
on products and purchasers? If the government wants to understand
the kind of technology Iran has been importing in the last two years,
it can go to the database and call up all the U.S. exports to Iran. If
the government notices suspicious patterns, it can take the
appropriate action. A company trying to compete in a global market is
less likely to notice "red flags" because it is not their first priority,
however, the Department of Homeland Security and the Department

186.
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of Defense1 8 9 are primarily concerned with national security and thus
more likely to see the warning signs.
Second, the computer database creates a system whereby the
government can follow up on the end-user of a good or technology. For
example, say the United States is worried that France is selling
technology legally acquired from an American company to Syria, a
transaction that U.S. export controls would otherwise prohibit.
Currently, there is no mechanism for checking what France is doing
with the technology. This is partly because the U.S. is mostly
unaware of France's exports because France is probably not on any
list that requires an ekporter to get a license for the transfer. With
the database on a computer system, the government can track the
technology that has been transferred to France, and then the
government can follow up with the party in France to determine how
they have used the technology. This, of course, requires cooperative
efforts and general agreements among the international community
to allow such a follow up. 190 Proposals for Wassenaar that focus on
end-use verification have been made by the United States, but
continue to be blocked by other countries (specifically Russia). 191
Notably, Wassenaar implemented an electronic information sharing
system in January 2002 called WAIS (Wassenaar Arrangement
Information System). 192 It allows members to post export denial
notices as soon as the state's government denies the license. 193 This
information could also be integrated into the system set up by the
United States and used to further enhance the ability of the
government to verify end-use. In the final analysis, a computer
database would give the U.S. government a chance to determine the
true end-user, whether French or Syrian.
B. Strengthen the WassenaarArrangement
In today's truly global marketplace, any effective U.S. export
control regime must have an international multilateral agreement
that can implement policies similar to those the United States
recognizes in its own export control regime. Strengthening
Wassenaar is the key to many of the proposals in this note. 194 Calls to
strengthen Wassenaar are nothing new after September 11, 2001.
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See generally Hiestand, supra note 110.
192.
See October 2002 GAO Report, supranote 34.
193.
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See Part IV.A supra (discussing end-use/end-user verification) and Part
194.
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Often the criticism focuses on member's incentives to act outside the
regime, a lack of effective information sharing, and an absence of preexport consultation. 1 95 In addressing these weaknesses, several
proposals have been put forth. However, one common thread is that
strengthening Wassenaar may be the most effective way of regulating
dual-use exports.
Because Wassenaar is not a legally binding international treaty,
a breach of the agreement does not violate international law. 196 Thus,
only the voluntary commitment of each member that drives the
regime. There is no concrete incentive, aside from acting in a
politically acceptable or moral manner, that can prevent member
states from acting outside the regime. This temptation to act outside
the regime is exacerbated by the lack of consultations and deficient
information sharing. By amplifying the distribution of information
and implementing a denial consultation system, transparency can be
increased. Transparency increases opportunities for negotiation or
counter-measures designed to prevent future transfers. 197 Because
transparency is the guiding principal behind achieving the objectives
in Wassenaar, 19s increasing transparency will mean greater honesty
in transfers, which means there is a greater likelihood of cooperation
among members of Wassenaar. This all results in a stronger
multilateral export regime for dual-use technologies and goods.
Information sharing was a problem identified in the recent GAO
report on multilateral export control regimes. 199 Despite the fact that
Wassenaar members are expected to share information on export
licenses, according to U.S. officials, the data is gathered only twice a
year and is aggregated to such a degree that it is virtually useless to
identify who is granting which licenses to what country. 20 In
addition, due to the rapid pace of technological development any list
of restricted items will frequently fall short of accurately reflecting
the current concerns of member nations. The implementation of the
electronic WAIS system is a step in the right direction toward
increasing the sharing of information. It allows members almost
instant access to license denials and grants. This makes it easier to
identify countries undercutting the regime and also gives other

195.
See Dursht, supra note 22, at 1079; Jaffer, supra note 124, at 519; see also
October 2002 GAO Report, supra note 34. See generally Nicole Day, The Canadian
Connection: Why the State Department is Ignoring a Loophole in the Arms Export
Control Act, 28 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 171 (1999); Karim K. Shehadeh, The Wassenaar
Arrangement and Encryption Exports: An Ineffective Export Control Regime that
Compromises United States Economic Interests, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 271 (1999).
196.
See Dursht, supra note 22, at 1114.
197.
Hiestand, supra note 110, at 721.
198.
Because it is a voluntary arrangement, one member cannot mandate
specific actions over another. See Dursht, supra note 20, at 1114.
199.
See October 2002 GAO Report, supra note 34.
200.
Id.
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members a chance to exert political pressure before a state grants a
license previously denied by another member.
The member states also need to increase the pace at which they
share information. As mentioned earlier, a member could get away
with reporting the grant of an export license where another member
has previously denied such export until after the item has already
been exported. In this situation, the other members could not really
do anything to prevent the export. Requiring the exporting nation to
report the export earlier is one way to allow other members to exert
pressure in cases in which one member is acting outside the interests
of the regime. In addition, more frequent reporting of license denials
and grants would greatly enhance members' ability to determine
what items should or should not be denied export licenses. Finally,
with technology growing and changing at such a rapid rate, members
need to be able to adapt to the changing international environment as
necessary. As information is exchanged among members on a more
frequent basis, they can assess more effectively the needs of the
Arrangement regarding what items should be removed from or added
to the restricted list.
Perhaps the most effective change to Wassenaar would be the
implementation of a denial consultation system. There is no veto
mechanism in Wassenaar and it contains only the weakest of "no
undercut" provisions. 20 1 They require members to provide
information about exports they deny and notification when a member
transfers items that are identical to products denied by other
members. 20 2 However, member nations can push these notification
requirements to the point that they only notify the other members
after the product is exported. While a veto provision sounds good in
theory, allowing any one nation to absolutely prohibit the transfer of
technology to a non-member in such a broad multinational agreement
as Wassenaar is unrealistic and unworkable.
Mandatory denial consultations can provide the necessary
mechanism for increasing transparency and dealing with states
acting outside the interests of Wasenaar.2 03 The United States has
been unsuccessfully pushing this denial consultation approach for
years. 20 4 Under this proposal, member states would be forced to

201.
Jaffer, supra note 124, at 521.
202.
Id. at 521-22.
203.
One study suggests replacing the current consensus decision-making
process with majority voting, formalizing the operations of the regime, introducing a
dispute resolutions mechanism, creating a tiered list of end-users, and strengthening
information-sharing requirements to include not only denial notifications, but
approvals as well. See generally Beck & Gahlaut, supranote 149.
204.
High-level U.S. Team Traveling to Europe to Press Case for Strengthening
Wassenaar, 19 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 18, May 2, 2002, at 787.
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consult with one another before issuing an export license on a good
that has already been denied to a non-member. 20 5 If the member
decides to go ahead with the transfer anyway, it would have to
provide the denying nation with an explanation for its decision to
20 6
grant the license.
This system would increase transparency and strengthen
Wassenaar in a number of ways. First, it provides members with a
chance to exert pressure on other members before they grant an
export license to a non-member. If France were considering granting
an export license for a dual-use good to be transferred to a nonmember, and the United States had denied a similar license
previously, denial consultation would force the French to consult with
the United States before granting the license. This affords the United
States a chance to pressure France into denying the export license
through political or diplomatic means. It also allows the United
States to make clear the penalties France would suffer if it granted
the export license.
Second, it keeps all members aware of the actions of other
members. In this, it would prevent a member state from acting
outside Wassenaar because the rogue member could no longer export
dual-use items under the radar. No longer would member nations
have an incentive not to report when they grant export licenses;
mandatory denial consultations require nations to consult with one
anther. Without denial consultation, member nations can risk
exporting dual-use goods previously denied exportation by other
members because they only have to report the sale within 30 to 60
days of granting the license, which may possibly be after the transfer
has occurred. Even then, member nations might hide the transfer to
avoid inciting other members. With denial consultation, member
nations must consult whenever a member nation has previously
denied a license the exporting state is considering granting. Thus,
other members will always know what goods might be going to which
countries. If other countries go ahead with the export, at minimum
the other members know which non-member has acquired a possibly
dangerous technology. This increases transparency within the
Wassenaar regime, which will strengthen its authority.
C. Develop transparencyin the U.S. export control regime
As important as it is to increase transparency within Wassenaar,
thereby strengthening the arrangement, it is just as important to
strive for increased transparency within the U.S. export control
regime. When countries are able to effectively track dual-use
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Jaffer, supra note 124, at 523.
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technology transfers, nations concerned with the potential
development of weapons from such items are able to assess the threat
posed by the unfriendly states that import such items. 20 7 Such a
system is considered "transparent." The mutual disclosure that is a
characteristic of transparent systems and as opposed to supply-side
regulation, fosters free trade. 20 8 Thus, mutual disclosure should be a
part of the government's relationship with U.S. businesses. The
administration has made some effort to improve transparency in
export controls with its Transshipment Country Export Control
Initiative (TECI) led by the BIS and announced in October 2002.209 It
has two main braAches: government-to-government initiatives and
government-to-private sector initiatives. 210 The goal of TECI is to
build public-private partnerships with all the players involved in
moving a product, thus building awareness of the problem of diverted
goods. Other goals include developing channels of communication
between industry and government and creating best practices
standards. 2 11 In other words, the TECI is an attempt to improve
transparency. Its success remains to be seen.
It should be apparent by now that since Wassenaar is part of the
U.S. export control regime, strengthening Wassenaar will enhance
transparency within the U.S. regime. Through more efficient and
timelier information sharing, and with the implementation of a
mandatory denial consultation system, the driving principal of
transparency behind Wassanaar can be strengthened. Naturally, as
the United States becomes more aware of what other countries are
doing in the international export arena, it will gain a better
understanding of exports at home. If other countries are granting
licenses for a particular item that the United States had previously
restricted, and after denial consultations the United States reversed
its position, then U.S. businesses benefit from the increased
transparency because they can now transfer a good previously denied
an export license.
Similarly, the United States needs to increase transparency visA-vis U.S. businesses. In May 2003, the BIS began seeking comments
on best practices guidelines to help companies minimize the risk of
sensitive exports being diverged illegally to countries or end-users of
concern. 212 To truly and effectively regulate exports in a manner

207.

Hiestand, supra note 110, at 720.

208.
Id. at 721.
209.
William New, PushingOut the Borders, 34 NAT'L J. No. 51, Dec. 21, 2002.
210.
Id.
211.
Id.
212.
Commerce Department Seeks Comments on Export Control "Best Practices"
for Industry, Bureau of Industry and Security press release (May 16, 2003), available
at www.bxa.doc.gov (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).

20041

RESTRUCTURING THE EXPORTADMINISTRA TION ACT

327

consistent with the stated goals of protecting national security and
enhancing U.S. competitiveness abroad, transparency (not to mention
cooperation) must be key in the relationship between the government
and the industry. A mandatory disclosure system established on a
computer database can greatly advance this interest. Recently, U.S.
Undersecretary of Commerce Kenneth Juster emphasized this need.
In the context of the bombing of an Indonesian nightclub in October
2002 and other bombings in the Philippines, Juster said, "[t]his is not
an issue government alone can handle. It has to be done in
''213
partnership with the private sector.
Under a mandatory disclosure system, the BIS should have an
2 14
easier time tracking the true application of dual-use technology.
The U.S. government could systematically verify the end-use by using
the computer database system. 215 By requiring companies to register
the transfer of certain items on this system, the company is making a
necessary disclosure to the U.S. government. By maintaining the
system in a way that allows companies to rely on previous licensing
grants and denials, the U.S. government is disclosing to the industry
what it requires of exports, making it easier for U.S. companies to
comply with regulations. Thus, everyone benefits as transparency
increases.
To garner the cooperation of U.S industry in the endeavor, the
government must make assurances that confidential business
information will be protected. As mentioned, any computer database
that allows companies to search past technology transfers will need to
ensure that a company feels secure in its disclosure to the
government. That means ensuring that the information accessible to
the industry must protect the confidentiality of technology involved in
these transfers. While a general description of the technology
adequate to assist a company in determining whether a license is
needed for an export should be on the system, more sensitive details
necessary for the government in determining whether to grant the
license request should not be included.
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D. Give the Department of Homeland Security Oversight
Finally, the record of dual-use technology regulation is littered
with obstacles in determining which agency has oversight of which
technologies, uncertainty over who to get the correct license from, and
inter-agency disputes over granting or denying licenses. Another
consideration for Congress in drafting new EAA legislation must be
whether to move regulatory power from Commerce to the new
Homeland Security Department. The Bureau of Industry and
Security should be moved, in its entirety, to the Department of
Homeland Security. Already, the bill establishing the Department
moved the BIS's Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) from
216
Commerce to Homeland Security, but not its export control unit.
The issue has come up in early staff-level discussions, and may be
pushed by members of the House and Senate when the legislation
comes before Congress. 217 Senator Shelby has already pushed for
giving the national security agencies the lead,2 18 putting Homeland
Security in charge simplifies the process of deciding who is in charge
of what aspects of export control. The rationale for such a move would
be that Commerce cannot be trusted with protecting national security
219
It
because one of its principal responsibilities is promoting exports.
also would be to eliminate bureaucratic confusion for U.S. companies
end disputes among the differing departments that regulate dual-use
exports.
Even before the Department of Homeland Security was created,
220
arguments were being made for consolidating this important work.
This approach called for staffing one export control office with
members of each concerned agency. 2 2 1 The difficulty in this approach
lies in determining which organization would be in charge of all the
others (clearly it should be the Defense or Homeland Security
Department rather than Commerce). 222 The reasoning is that
22 3
national security trumps promoting the interests of U.S. exports.
Finding the political will for such a move would prove difficult and
potentially embarrassing for any administration. This problem is
ameliorated by the creation of an entirely new department. Now that
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the Homeland Security Department exists, moving control of dual-use
export controls to it solves the political problems associated with
moving multiple agencies.
Once oversight of dual-use technology is transferred to
Homeland Security, that Department can create a central licensing
authority in order to streamline the export control regime. This
central licensing authority can maintain the computer database
discussed above. It can administer the national mandatory disclosure
system for U.S. industry exports and manage denial consultations for
export issues that arise under Wassenaar. Supervising these various
aspects of the dual-use export regime will only make the office more
efficient and knowledgeable once it gets up and running.
In addition, though Homeland Security is primarily concerned
with protecting the country from deadly threats, it is supposed to do
so in a way that does not significantly alter the U.S. way of life. Thus,
with dual-use goods and technology, national security can be
protected without strangling U.S. industry in the international
marketplace. It is also important to consider that Homeland Security
is relatively new and still in the process of defining the exact contours
of its mission. Thus, there is room for the new export control office to
grow in its role within that Department.
This idea has received strong support from U.S. technology
exporters, mainly because it could potentially erase inefficient and
costly delays in export licensing. 224 It would increase transparency,
making it easier for businesses to identify which items need licenses.
Having a central licensing authority would also give the industry a
single agency to work with, furthering the two goals of the U.S.
export control regime, which benefits us all.

V. CONCLUSION

Soviet leader V.I. Lenin went to his grave believing that one day
the West would sell its adversaries the rope with which it would be
hanged. 225 The events of September 11, 2001 and recent revelations
concerning the export of dual-use goods and technologies demonstrate
that this belief is not unrealistic. As Congress and the White House
attempt to write legislation recreating the EAA, it is imperative they
keep in mind the balance they want to strike between the often
competing goals of the U.S. export control regime: protecting national
security and promoting U.S. industry in the international
marketplace.
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The current dual-use export control regime suffers from many
flaws. The myriad of statutes and regulations that govern dual-use
technology transfers have created a bureaucracy that is
unmanageable for both the private sector and the government.
Wassenaar offers perhaps the best chance for truly effective
international controls, though it suffers from deficient information
sharing and lacks any effective provisions to prevent undercutting.
Trying to understand and comply with the current system costs U.S.
companies time, money, and business. Agency disagreements are
well-known and often accepted as part of the process. Also, there is a
serious inability to follow up on the end-use of dual-use technology as
well as the end-user of such items.
The starting point for solving the many imperfections associated
with the current dual-use export control regime is with the new EAA
legislation. Congress should attempt to enhance end-use and end-user
verification through the establishment of a computer database that can
centralize and maintain records regarding export licenses. The U.S.
needs to continue pressuring the members of Wassenaar to approve
denial consultations and institute better information sharing
provisions. Establishing the computer database and strengthening
Wassenaar follow the principal of enhancing transparency, which is the
backbone of any effective export control regime. By instituting a
mandatory disclosure system for U.S. businesses, transparency will be
further increased, as well as the ability to verify end-use and endusers. Finally, moving control over all dual-use items to the
Department of Homeland Security will create a central licensing
authority with the political ability to execute the many needed
improvements.
It has become apparent that as the twenty-first century has
dawned, the peace and prosperity of the late twentieth will not come
as easily in the future as it has in the past. If anything, it will involve
striking difficult balances between national security and economic
viability. The importance of the Export Administration Act cannot be
underestimated in establishing this balance. It can strengthen the
U.S. export control regime while promoting the economic health of
those in U.S. industry who export dual-use items. This issue must be
dealt with soon; history has demonstrated crisis is usually required to
invoke reform. As Micheal Beck and Seema Gaulaut of the Arms
Control Association have put it:
Two possible futures await us. Either international efforts to
strengthen the norms and legal barriers to weapons of mass destruction
will be bolstered through a significantly improved regime or
international efforts to monitor dangerous technologies and weaponry
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will falter. If our choice is the latter, we will have repeated the mistake
2 26
of selling the rope used to hang ourselves.
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